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Abstract
Recent theories of decision-making have hinted that affect might be useful during
some decision-making processes. I propose a model, the affective evaluation model,
which defines the role of affect in decision-making as helpful when affect is decisionrelevant and unhelpful when it is not. In three studies, I manipulate the decisionrelevance of affect to test this central component of the affective evaluation model. Study
1 demonstrates that emphasizing decision-relevant affective signals facilitates optimal
decision-making as compared to emphasizing purely cognitive evaluations. Study 2 tests
the hypothesis that creating the expectation that affect is useful can facilitate decisionmaking. Finally, Study 3 tests the hypothesis that creating the expectation that affect is
useful during decision-making can selectively improve decision making when affect is
decision-relevant but not when it is decision-irrelevant, and demonstrates that instructing
individuals to rely purely on cognitive evaluations can increase risk aversion. Together
these studies find moderate support for a central tenet of the affective evaluation model
that it is decision-relevance that determines whether affect is helpful or hurtful during
decision-making and examines ways in which training or framing can optimize the
decision-making process.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Affect and reason have often been characterized as opposing forces in the battle
over human behavior. In fact, this rivalry is so deeply rooted in my conceptualization of
these entities that lay opinion and scientific inquiry have often considered them mostly
separately, or examined instances in which one “wins” over the other. This struggle is
especially pronounced in the field of decision science, in which classical models regarded
affect as a source of noise, not information (Edwards, 1954; Neumann & Morgenstern,
1947). This characterization came at a cost. Specifically, models that disregard affective
responses were consistently shown to be far less predictive of human behavior than
models that incorporate them (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Subsequent models of
decision-making have embraced affect as an integral component of the process, and even
posited that it may be a necessary component for adaptive decision-making. The present
research details such models, examines the circumstances under which affective signals
lead to sub-optimal and optimal decision-making, and proposes a model for the adaptive
role of affect in complex decision-making. Finally, I present the results from three studies
that begin to test conditions under which affect may consistently contribute to optimal
choice.
1

Models of Affect and Decision-making
Affect has been integrated into decision-making theories under the umbrella of
dual-process models (Brocas & Carrillo, 2014). For the purposes of this research I define
affect as rapid, valenced responses to stimuli that are often conveyed through bodily
signals and may or may not be accompanied by an explicit cognitive inference/subjective
feeling. The central premise of such models is that individuals rely on both deliberative
(i.e., cognitive-appraisal based judgments often characterized by slower, rule-based
processing, often occurring in conscious awareness) and intuitive processes (i.e.,
affective-evaluation based judgments often characterized by faster, holistic processing,
that may or may not be conscious) to make their decision. The nuances of each model
distinguish ways in which these two processes interact, the circumstances in which
individuals rely on one more than another, and the circumstances under which one leads
to more optimal decisions than another (for reviews see, Evans & Olson, 2007; Weber &
Johnson, 2009). Reviewed below is a selection of dual-process models that highlight
affect as a key component of the model and characterize how affective signals can
negatively or positively influence decision-making.
Considering Affect in Decision-making
Prospect theory. A seminal theory in decision-science, prospect theory
revolutionized economics by demonstrating that affective responses to choices can cause
systematic biases in decision-making. These biases may lead individuals to make
decisions that may not be in their best interest (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). One foundational concept of prospect
2

theory is loss aversion. Loss aversion refers to people’s tendency to overweight a loss as
compared to the same monetary gain; loss aversion produces a pattern of decisionmaking that suggests individuals do not simply assess the overall objective value of each
option but also the affective value, or a summary value based on how one feels towards
the option. Loss aversion leads to risk aversion, where risk is defined as a choice with a
less than 100% probability of a particular outcome but where that probability is known
(versus uncertainty in which the probability is unknown; Tversky & Fox, 1995). Risk
aversion results in the phenomenon that individuals overvalue certain outcomes even if
the riskier choice would lead to a greater gain. Finally, what is even more striking is that
these effects are evident when the difference is merely in the presentation, or framing of
the choices (Benjamin & Robbins, 2007; Kühberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth,
1998; Rabin, 2000).
Subsequent research has extended these seminal findings demonstrating that
affective influences in decision-making—specifically economic decision-making—often
lead to sub-optimal choices as measured by the amount of financial gain. Namely, in
investment paradigms in which participants are asked to make an investment under a
certain amount of risk, participants often under-invest even though investing regardless of
the risk would ultimately leave them with the most amount of money (Shiv, Loewenstein,
Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2005). In these tasks, affective biasing (i.e., an affective
influence on decision-making) is thought to prevent risk taking even when that risk
would lead to better outcomes. For example, in one paradigm (Shiv et al., 2005),
participants are given a dollar and told that they may invest or keep their dollar.
3

Importantly, task contingencies are set up to insure that always investing will lead to the
most profitable outcome. Healthy participants and patients with cognitive deficits (but not
affective deficits) did not make the most optimal choice (i.e., always investing), though
patients with affective deficits consistently chose to invest, leading to more optimal
decision-making. This pattern indicates that ability to ‘rationally’ choose the riskier
option is improved by a lack of affect, suggesting that affective responding leads to loss
(and risk) aversion. These results provide neurologically-informed evidence consistent
with the central tenet of prospect theory, namely that affective biases move individuals
away from “optimal” choice (Shiv et al., 2005).
Although prospect theory highlighted the importance of affective evaluations, it
did not attribute the biases solely to differences in affective evaluation, but also other
cognitive heuristics that might bias decision-making. Most importantly, it limited the
examination of how affective evaluations might hinder decision-making as a
supplementary form of information, rather than examining how affect might be necessary
to the decision-making process. Subsequent research has begun to examine these
questions and build upon the substantial foundation of prospect theory.
Risk as feeling. The risk-as-feeling hypothesis extends prospect theory, which
viewed biases as primarily detrimental and tangential to decision-making, by stating that
feelings are a source of information as central to decision-making as other cognition. In
fact, when affective responses and other cognitions diverge, feelings often dictate
behavioral outcomes (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee & Welch, 2001). In a novel stance, the
authors highlight the independent influence of affective information, especially in the
4

domain of decision-making under risk. The risk-as-feeling model posits that responses to
risky situations are a composite of both direct affective influences and cognitive
evaluations. The theory states that direct—or anticipatory—affect is generated from the
stimulus itself, a direct reaction to a feature of your decision (e.g., a reaction to the color,
price, or size of something) and is independent of cognitive evaluations (Floresco &
Ghods-Sharifi, 2007; Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2004; Slovic & Peters,
2006; Song & Schwarz, 2009).
According to this theory, anticipatory affect in response to choice options is
therefore relatively uninfluenced by subsequent reframing or other cognitive influences.
This independence can lead to divergent behavioral outcomes, one dictated by cognitive
evaluations and one by affective responses. When such a divergence occurs, the model
predicts that affective responses will determine behavioral outcomes. For example,
individuals are much more fearful of airplane than car crashes, even though car crashes
are much more likely. Their fear dictates their decision not to fly and the statistics of car
crashes does nothing to deter participation in rush hour traffic (Loewenstein, Weber,
Hsee & Welch, 2001). The cognitive evaluation of such outcomes should take these
probabilities into account but in this example, cognitive and affective responses diverge
and affect ultimately dictates decision behavior.
A critical prediction of the risk-as-feeling hypothesis is that anticipatory affect
can independently influence decision-making, even flying under the radar of conscious
awareness. Building on the work of Zajonc (1984), this assertion that affective reactions
to risky stimuli need no inferences promotes affect from a supporting to leading role in
5

the decision-making story. Removing the need for a cognitive interpretation of affective
reactions allows affect to stand alone, influencing decision-making separately from other
cognitive processes. Furthermore, subsequent research reveals that direct neural
projections from sensory regions can bypass cognitive regions to directly influence
behavior (Öngür & Price, 2000; Zald, 2003). Demonstrating that affective responses can
bypass systems that generate inferences but still can have an impact on behavior makes
affective responding a central influence in the decision-making process, rather than a
supplemental influence to cognitive inferences.
By theorizing that affective evaluations have as much (or perhaps more) influence
over decisions under risk as cognitive evaluations, the risk-as-feeling model extends
traditional consequentialist models of decision-making into a domain that factors in
affective responding as much as cognitive evaluations. To argue for its distinct influence,
the model thoroughly explores instances in which affective evaluations diverge from
cognitive evaluations, demonstrating that in these cases affective evaluations often
predict behavior. Although this model demonstrates the independent influence of
affective information from cognitive evaluations in risky decision-making, like prospect
theory, it also does not view affective influences as adaptive in decision-making.
Subsequent models have begun to propose an adaptive role for affective information in
decision-making.
An Informative Role for Affect in Decision-making
Affect-as-information hypothesis. The affect-as-information hypothesis
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983) states that individuals use the affect experienced at the moment
6

of the decision, as a reaction to what is being judged, to guide behavior. This
phenomenon has been illustrated in a myriad of domains as disparate as consumer
products (Adaval, 2013) to life satisfaction (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In the latter
example, participants reported greater life satisfaction on sunny days compared to rainy,
demonstrating that they inferred that their ‘sunny’ disposition (that was actually due to
the weather) was in fact due to their overall satisfaction with their life (Schwarz & Clore,
1983). The affect-as-information hypothesis explains such patterns of behavior as the
result of individuals using their affective states at the time of decision-making as an
indication of the value of the target of their choice. This example demonstrates the
influence of incidental affective evaluations on subsequent judgment. The affect-asinformation hypothesis further posits that in addition to incidental affective evaluations,
affective evaluations can also be caused by the decision options. Importantly, these
evaluations are adaptive and often provide critical decision-relevant information about
possible outcomes. These decision-relevant, affective evaluations can be generated in
response to any sort of option or option feature, whether they are similar (e.g., the price
of each option) or dissimilar (e.g., the style of option 1 and the status of option 2). Affect
therefore may serve as a common currency through which individuals can compare
distinct options that may not have many features that are comparable through cognitive
evaluation alone (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007).
By elevating affect from an oppositional to complementary role in relation to
cognitive evaluations, the affect-as-information hypothesis provides a theoretical
framework through which subsequent research can examine how these two sources of
7

information influence decision-making in the presence of one another. This model
solidifies that affect plays a critical role in decision-making, and proposes (at least
theoretically) that this role is a helpful one. However, because of the potentially
incidental nature of affective evaluations as described in the affect-as-information
hypothesis, it remains unclear when individuals should ignore their affective evaluations
and when they should rely on them as a source of decision-bound information.
Somatic marker hypothesis. Based on previous research and foundational,
theoretical frameworks that help describe a myriad of decision-making scenarios, it is
clear that affective signals play a role in decision-making. Defining exactly what that role
is and how it influences decision-making is the primary aim of the somatic marker
hypothesis. The central premise of the somatic-marker hypothesis is that affective
signals conveyed through bio-regulatory mechanisms (e.g., changes in bodily state such
as electro-dermal activity, endocrine release, heart rate, smooth muscle contraction,
posture, facial expression, etc.) are necessary for adaptive decision-making (Bechara &
Damasio, 2005; Dunn, Dalgleish & Lawrence, 2006; Reimann & Bechara, 2010). Thus,
the hypothesis makes two important assertions: 1) That bio-regulatory mechanisms
convey affective information that is related to the decision at hand, and 2) that use of this
affective information during decision-making is in fact adaptive. These are significant
additions to previous theories that acknowledged the benefit of affective evolutions in
decision-making but did not claim that they were essential to adaptive choice (Schwarz &
Clore, 1983; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Khaneman & Tversky,
1979).
8

The most frequent empirical tests of the somatic marker hypothesis come from the
Iowa Gambling Task. In the task, participants are presented with four decks of cards, two
of which will yield a greater net reward and two of which will yield a greater net loss.
The task contingencies are not explained to the participant. Instead, participants are told
that they will receive money according to the cards they select. Healthy participants
generate skin conductance responses in response to risky decisions and through
experience. Then, healthy participants begin to select solely from the advantageous deck,
demonstrating that they have learned which deck leads to better outcomes, (Bechara &
Damasio, 2005; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). These skin conductance responses (or somatic
markers) have been interpreted as signal, cautioning the participant about a
disadvantageous decision or driving them towards the advantageous one. Participants
with damage to areas of the brain that interpret affective signals did not produce
appropriate skin conductance signals and therefore did not learn to discriminate between
the advantageous and disadvantageous deck (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). These findings
were taken as evidence for the somatic marker hypothesis and the critical role that
affective signals play in adaptive decision-making.
The somatic marker hypothesis extends the role of affect from complimentary to
necessary in the decision-making process. Not only are somatic markers generated by
affective responses essential to the decision-making process, but cognitive evaluation
may even be superfluous as participants began to choose from the advantageous deck
before they could report why they were doing so (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara,
Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 2005; Dunn et al., 2006). However, determining that
9

affective evaluations are adaptive during decision-making does not address if they are
always necessary but supplemental additions to cognitive evaluations of decision-options,
or, if there are some circumstances under which affective evaluations can independently
lead to adaptive decision-making. Subsequent research aims to fill this gap and provides a
hypothesis for more ecologically valid circumstances under which affective evaluations
are not only necessary to decision-making, but can even outperform their cognitive
counterparts.
Unconscious Thought Theory
The somatic marker hypothesis made the important contribution of highlighting
how essential affect is to decision-making. However, it considered the role of affect in
largely associative decision-making paradigms in which choices unfolded over time,
often specific to risk and money, and each option often had a single attribute on which to
be judged. The decisions examined in the somatic marker hypothesis are undoubtedly
relevant to every-day life; however, these relatively simple choices do not characterize all
of the choices I make in daily life. Under the framework of unconscious thought theory,
another field of research has begun to examine more complex decisions in which each
option has multiple attributes and comparison across options.
In the paradigm most associated with this theory, participants are presented with
four options, each with a number of attributes, with one option being the objectively best
choice (75% positive attributes), one being the objectively worst choice (25% positive
attributes) and two neutral options (50% positive attributes). Participants assigned to the
simple condition are presented with four options each with four attributes, and asked to
10

select one. Participants assigned to the complex condition are presented with four options
each with twelve attributes, and asked to select one. Participants read the attributes and
are then instructed to either deliberate about their options for three minutes (Deliberation
condition) or complete anagrams for three minutes (Distraction condition). The typical
pattern of results reveal that those in the Distraction condition chose the objectively best
car approximately 50-60% of the time regardless of complexity, while those in the
Deliberation condition chose the objectively best car 60% of the time in the simple
condition, but only 20% of the time in the complex condition (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).
Importantly, these results reveal a counterintuitive characteristic of decision-making that
suggests that there are some circumstances in which careful, conscious, and systematic
thought might lead to worse decisions than relatively effortless intuition.
The theoretical framework used to explain these results has largely focused on the
cognitive biases (e.g., availability heuristic; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and limited
capacity of attention (e.g., processing information serially and only up to a certain
amount; Miller, 1956) that are characteristic of the Deliberation condition, forcing
participants to process each piece of information separately, thus preventing integration
of large amounts of information (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Strick et al., 2011). On the other
hand, the Distraction condition is not constrained by the limits of attention because in this
condition the information is processed outside of direct conscious awareness, providing a
more integrated impression of the options. Relatively little has been theorized about if
and how information is actually being integrated during the Distraction condition, and
what that “information” is made of. Previous research and dual-process models of
11

decision-making suggest that affect might be one option. The current model expands on
this suggestion by asserting that it is not necessarily a deficit of conscious thought that
leads to poorer decision-making in the Deliberation condition but an over-reliance on
cognitive evaluations in the decision-making process.

12

Chapter Two: Affective Evaluation Model
As reviewed above, affect informs decision-making in a myriad of contexts, and
many modern models of decision-making highlight affect as an integral part of the
decision-making process (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Damasio,
1994). The present model extends such models by proposing that decision-relevant affect
plays a central, and critical role in adaptive decision-making. According to this model,
when making a decision (e.g., deciding between two cars) one first generates affective
evaluations of the option attributes, which are then summarized into an “affective value,”
and reliance on this affective value will lead to more optimal decision-making.
I define affective evaluations as rapid, central and peripheral physiological
responses resulting from processing a specific stimulus (e.g., an attribute) that generate
an approach or avoidance signal (depending on the valence generated by the stimuli), and
may or may not be consciously processed as valenced, feeling states. Importantly,
affective evaluations are decision-relevant affective responses. The model does not posit
that general affective responses during decision-making are universally helpful; therefore,
decision-relevant affective evaluations refer only to those affective responses that are
generated in response to the evaluation of the decision objects. I characterize “affective
13

value” as the weighted summary of these affective evaluations, leading to a single value
for each option.
The affective evaluation model proposes that when participants are presented with
an option and its attributes, autonomic responses similar to those described in the somatic
marker hypothesis are generated (Damasio, 1994) and translated into affective
evaluations (that may or may not be conscious) for each attribute. These signals or
evaluations are then synthesized, forming a weighted summary, creating a singular
affective value for each option, which is then conveyed as a feeling of preference for each
option. The emphasis on affect in the affective evaluation model should not be interpreted
as a denouncement of the importance of cognitive evaluations. Decision-relevant
cognitive evaluations can be helpful in complex decision-making so long as they are
unbiased, and translated with fidelity into the common currency of affective evaluations.
As stated previously, affective responses are not universally adaptive, as decisionirrelevant affective information adds error when summarizing the affective evaluations to
generate the affective value. The affective evaluation model proposes that affect will be
helpful during decision-making when it is decision-relevant and when it can be applied to
the decision at hand before the intrusion of decision-irrelevant cognition or affect. The
key additions of the affective evaluation model are 1) a proposed process through which
affect facilitates optimal decision-making, and 2) a theory that might shed some light on
the mixed findings concerning the role of affect in decision-making described above.

14

The Present Research
The present research aimed to examine the central tenet of the affective evaluation
model: Decision-relevant, affective evaluations facilitate optimal decision-making.
Studies 1 and 2 used the complex decision-making task commonly used to examine
unconscious thought theory (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). Using affective and neutral
instruction conditions, these studies aimed to determine if optimal decision-making could
be facilitated or disrupted by varying levels of, and the use of decision-relevant affective
information. In previous work the benefits of the Distraction condition, as exemplified by
optimal choice and post-choice satisfaction, have been attributed to the presence of
unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). The current model proposes that the
benefits of the Distraction condition are in fact due to the affective evaluations of the
option attributes, their subsequent uninterrupted synthesis into an affective value, and the
reliance on this affective value to make the decision. In contrast, previous work blames
the poor performance of the Deliberation condition on the capacity limits of conscious
thought and the disruptive nature of cognitive biases. The current model proposes that the
costs of the Deliberation condition may result not from all types of deliberation, but from
an over-reliance on biased cognitive evaluations, neglecting decision-relevant affective
evaluations all together, thus preventing any accurate summary of such evaluations or the
generation of a single affective value on which to base a decision.
Using the complex decision making task (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), Study 1 tested
the following hypotheses: 1) If the use of task relevant, affective evaluations contribute to
optimal decision-making, then instructing individuals to deliberately reflect on their
15

feelings after learning of their options should increase optimal decision-making and 2) If
the use of decision-relevant, affective evaluations contributes to optimal decisionmaking, then the introduction of decision-irrelevant, affective information should
decrease optimal decision-making. The primary goal of this study was to examine the
central tenant of the affective evaluation model and lay the groundwork for future
examination of this phenomenon.
Study 2 also used the complex decision making task to examine the importance of
affective evaluations in decision-making, by manipulating the expectations individuals
have about the helpfulness of affective signals. By informing participants that affective
evaluations are helpful during decision-making, participants may rely on such evaluations
to a greater extent, ostensibly increasing their reliance on decision-relevant signals. To
see if expectations can be manipulated to discourage the use of affective evaluations,
participants were informed that only cognition is helpful during decision-making,
ostensibly decreasing their reliance on decision-relevant affective signals. Therefore,
Study 2 tested the following hypotheses: 1) If affective evaluations are helpful during
decision making, then increasing the expectation that they will be helpful should increase
optimal decision-making, and 2) If affective evaluations are helpful during decision
making, then increasing the expectation that cognition alone is helpful should decrease
optimal decision-making.
Finally, Study 3 continued to examine the central tenet of the affective evaluation
model by asking if manipulating expectations about the usefulness of affect will
selectively improve choice under conditions when affect is decision-relevant or decision16

irrelevant. This study used a decision-making under risk paradigm that asks participants
to decide between two options, one more certain than another (Slot Machine Game;
Martin, Herrera & Delgado, 2014). Importantly, the options with the greatest expected
value (i.e., the option that leads to the greatest amount of monetary gain on average) were
sometimes the ‘safer’ option, or the ‘riskier’ option. Thus affective reactions to risk are
decision-irrelevant, as they cannot consistently predict optimal outcomes. This paradigm
therefore instantiates both decision-irrelevant, affective responses (i.e., responses to risk),
and decision-relevant affective evaluations (i.e., response to the higher expected value
outcome) allowing for a critical test: If increasing individuals’ expectations that affect is
helpful during decision-making simply increases awareness of all affective responding,
then participants should make more risk-adverse decisions regardless of the expected
value of the choice. However, if increasing individuals’ expectations that affect is helpful
during decision-making increases the reliance upon decision-relevant affective
evaluations, then participants should choose the option with the greater expected value
even when that choice is riskier. These competing hypotheses allow for the examination
of both the affective evaluation component of the present model, and to determine
whether instructing individuals to reflect on their emotions is an effective way to increase
optimal decision-making.

17

Chapter Three: Study 1
Study 1 assessed whether attending to decision-relevant affective evaluations
could facilitate decision-making and whether introducing decision-irrelevant affective
information could interfere with decision-making. Using the complex decision-making
paradigm (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), Study 1 compared the traditional Neutral
Deliberation and Neutral Distraction conditions to modified Affective Deliberation and
Affective Distraction conditions. Study 1 also included an Immediate condition as a
baseline for decision-making. The Affective Deliberation condition asked participants to
consider their feelings towards the stimuli, theoretically increasing the impact of
decision-relevant affective evaluations and potentially increasing the proportion of
optimal choice occurring in this condition as compared to the Neutral Deliberation
condition. The Affective Distraction condition asked participants to solve anagrams of
emotionally evocative words as opposed to neutral words, thus introducing decisionirrelevant affective information and potentially decreasing the amount of optimal choice
occurring in this condition as compared to the Neutral Distraction condition. Thus, Study
1 tests whether decision-relevance can distinguish helpful affective evaluations from
affective responses that hinder decision-making.

Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Denver and the surrounding
community (M = 19.91 years, SD = 2.81; 70% female). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of five conditions: 45 in Neutral Deliberation, 47 in Neutral Distraction,
44 in Affective Deliberation, 46 in Affective Distraction, and 46 in the Immediate
condition. Participants were required to be at least 18 years of age, and be fluent in
English.
Procedure
Participants were recruited to participate in an hour-long, computer-based task,
using community flyers, online advertisements and classroom announcements. The study
was conducted in a specialized room equipped to measure psychophysiology. Participants
were given a consent form and the opportunity to ask any questions about the study
procedure. After consent, participants were connected to electrodermal activity (EDA)
sensors; they were then instructed to begin the task1.
The basic task design was closely modeled after the complex decision-making
task used in studies examining unconscious thought theory (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Strick,
Dijksterhuis, Bos, Sjoerdsma & van Baaren, 2011). Participants were told that they would
be presented with information about four cars and asked to choose one of those cars at a
later stage. Each car was comprised of 12 clearly positive (e.g., the Hatsdun has good

1

Skin conductance data were unusable. Due to a lab-wide error, for a brief period of time
I used skin conductance electrodes with a solution that was not designed for skin
conductance data collection. Unfortunately, this means that those data were not
interpretable. Therefore, I have decided not to use any of the skin conductance data
collected now or in the future.
19

mileage) or negative (e.g., the Hatsdun has bad service) attributes. One car was the
objectively best car with 75% positive attributes, two cars were neutral with 50% positive
attributes, and one car was the worst car with 25% positive attributes. Stimuli were
presented using E-prime stimulus presentation software and proceeded as follows: All 12
attributes of the first car were presented at once and participants had 12 seconds to read
this information. The attributes of the first car stayed on the screen while the 12 attributes
of the second car appeared. This continued until the attributes of all four cars appeared on
the screen together. Participants then had an additional 12 seconds to read information
about all of the cars. After all information about each car was presented, participants were
asked to either deliberate for four minutes and then choose one car, solve anagrams for
four minutes and then choose one car, or to immediately choose one car. For 62% of
participants, additional attitude ratings were collected after car selection. Positive and
negative attitudes towards each car were collected on a four-point scale (e.g., 0 being not
positive/negative at all, 2 being somewhat positive/negative, 3 being positive/negative, 4
being very positive/negative). Participants then completed a funneled debriefing form
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) to assess their knowledge of task contingencies and
hypotheses, no participants were excluded based on the debriefing.
After funneled debriefing, participants were disconnected from the
psychophysiological equipment, given a break and asked to complete several
questionnaires to assess demographics, individual differences, and task compliance. Only
task compliance data will be discussed for the purposes of this dissertation. Finally,
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participants were fully debriefed, compensated with cash or course credit, and thanked
for their participation.
The procedure above was consistent across all conditions. The key difference
occurred after all the information about each car had been presented. This was a betweensubjects design in which participants were assigned to one of the following five
conditions:
Neutral Deliberation: In this condition participants were asked to “think very carefully
about what you think of each of the four cars” (emphasis added) for four minutes before
they were asked to choose which car was best. This condition was designed to replicate
previous effects and to provide a comparison for the Affective Deliberation condition.
Affective Deliberation: In this condition participants were asked to “think very carefully
about how you feel about each of the four cars” (emphasis added) for four minutes before
they were asked to choose which car was best. The affective emphasis in the instructions
for this condition were designed to increase the participants’ awareness of their own
affective responses towards the car choices, potentially attenuating some of the
detrimental effects typically seen in the Neutral Deliberation condition.
Neutral Distraction: In this condition participants were asked to solve anagrams of
affectively neutral words before they were asked to choose which car was best. This
condition was also designed to replicate previous effects and provides a comparison for
the Affective Deliberation condition.
Affective Distraction: In this condition participants were asked to solve anagrams of
highly arousing, affectively positive and negative words before they were asked to
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choose which car was best. The affective responses evoked by the positively and
negatively valenced anagrams were intended to introduce affective signals during the
distraction period that were not related to the car options.
Immediate: In this condition participants were asked to make their decision immediately
after all of the option attributes were been presented. This condition served as a noinstruction comparison for all above manipulations.
Data Analytic Strategy
Based on previous studies, my primary measures of interest were 1) the number of
participants who selected the objectively best car and 2) the attitude ratings towards each
car. The numbers of participants who selected the best car in each condition were
compared in a series of chi-squared tests of independence. First, an omnibus chi squared
test of independence comparing the number of participants who selected the best car
across all five conditions was conducted. Second, as a replication of previous results, the
prediction that more participants in the Neutral Distraction condition would choose the
objectively best car as compared to participants in the Neutral Deliberation condition was
tested. Third, to test the first hypothesis that instructing individuals to deliberately reflect
on their feelings should increase optimal decision-making, the prediction that more
participants in the Affective Deliberation condition would choose the objectively best car
as compared to those in the Neutral Deliberation condition was tested. Finally, to test the
second hypothesis that introducing decision-irrelevant affective information should
decrease optimal decision-making, the prediction that participants in the Neutral
Distraction condition would choose the objectively best car compared to those in the
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Affective Distraction condition was tested. When chi-squared tests of independence were
significant, odds-ratios were computed by first dividing the number of participants that
selected the best car by those that did not select the best car in each condition, and then
dividing the larger resulting ratio by the smaller resulting ratio. All chi-squared
independence tests met the expected count assumption with all counts for each 2x2 test
greater than 5.
To mimic the choice behavior analyses, means of the positive and negative
attitude ratings only towards the objectively best car were analyzed using a one-way
ANOVA. First, an omnibus one-way ANOVA was conducted with all five conditions
predicting attitude ratings towards the objectively best car. Due to strong a priori
predictions, follow-up independent samples t-tests were conducted with the predictions
that participants in the Neutral Distraction condition would rate the objectively best car
more appropriately (i.e., more positively and less negatively) than those in the Neutral
Deliberation condition, that those in the Affective Deliberation condition would rate the
objectively best car more appropriately than those in the Neutral Deliberation condition,
and finally that those in the Neutral Distraction condition would rate the objectively best
car more appropriately than those in the Affective Distraction condition.
Results
Choice behavior. The number of participants that selected the objectively best
car in each condition was submitted to a chi-squared test of independence. The overall
chi-square with all five conditions (i.e., Neutral Deliberation, Neutral Distraction,
Affective Deliberation, Affective Distraction, and Immediate) indicated that condition
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had a trend-level effect on whether or not the best car was selected, χ2(4) = 8.63, p = .07
(see Appendix A for the percent of participants within each condition who selected the
best car).
Pairwise comparisons indicated that the original effect (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006)
was replicated such that, of the participants who selected the objectively best car, a
greater percentage were in the Neutral Distraction condition (60.4%) than the Neutral
Deliberation condition (39.6%), χ2(1) = 4.32, p = .04. Participants in the Neutral
Distraction condition were 2.44 times more likely to select the best car than participants
in the Neutral Deliberation condition.
The hypothesis that instructing individuals to deliberately reflect on their feelings
should increase optimal decision-making was also supported, given that of the
participants who selected the objectively best car a greater percentage were in the
Affective Deliberation condition (58.8%) than in the Neutral Deliberation condition
(41.2%), χ2(1) = 4.21, p = .04, such that participants in the Affective Deliberation
condition were 2.45 times more likely to choose the best car than participants in the
Neutral Deliberation condition. The second hypothesis that introducing decisionirrelevant affective information should decrease optimal decision-making was not
supported by the data, as there was no significant association between the Neutral
Distraction (52.5%) versus Affective Distraction (47.5) and whether or not participants
selected the best car, χ2(1) = 0.26, p = .61.
Finally, exploratory analyses comparing each condition to the Immediate
condition investigated whether a decision without any delay period resulted in better or
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worse decisions as compared to each of the other four conditions. Of the participants who
selected the objectively best car, a greater percentage of participants were in the Neutral
Distraction condition (59.3%) compared to the Immediate condition (40.7%), χ2(1) =
3.92, p = .05, such that participants in the Neutral Distraction condition were 2.33 times
more likely to select the best car than participants in the Immediate condition. Of the
participants who selected the objectively best car, a greater percentage of participants
were in the Affective Deliberation condition (57.7%) compared to the Immediate
condition (42.3%), χ2(1) = 3.82, p = .05, such that participants in the Affective
Deliberation condition were 2.34 times more likely to select the best car than participants
in the Immediate condition. There was no significant association between the Immediate,
Neutral Deliberation, or Affective Distraction conditions and whether or not participants
selected the best car (all ps > .14).
Attitude ratings. To most informatively supplement the choice data analyses,
which focused on the objectively best car, attitude analyses also focused on the attitudes
towards the best car. First, for the positive attitude scale with higher numbers indicating a
more positive attitude, a one-way ANOVA with all five conditions was conducted
revealing no effect of condition, F (4, 136) = 0.86, p = .86, η2= .01. However, because of
my a priori predictions I conducted independent samples t-tests that mirrored my analyses
of choice behavior. Unlike in choice behavior, I did not see a difference between Neutral
Deliberation and Neutral Distraction, between Neutral Deliberation and Affective
Deliberation, nor a difference between the Immediate condition and each of the other four
conditions in how positively participants in each condition rated the objectively best car
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(all ps > .46). As in choice behavior, I did not see a difference between Neutral
Distraction and Affective Distraction in how positively participants in each condition
rated the objectively best car, p = .98 (see Appendix B for figure of positive affect
ratings).
Next, for the negative attitude scale with higher numbers indicating a more
negative attitude, a one-way ANOVA with all five conditions was conducted revealing
no effect of condition, F (4, 136) = 1.93, p = .11, η2= .05. As with the positive ratings I
did not see a difference between Neutral Deliberation and Neutral Distraction nor a
difference between Neutral Deliberation and Affective Deliberation in how negatively
participants in each condition rated the objectively best car (all ps > .15). However,
contrary to hypotheses, I did see a difference between Neutral Distraction and Affective
Distraction in how negatively participants in each condition rated the objectively best car,
t(55) = 2. 19, p = .03, such that participants in the Neutral Distraction condition rated the
best car more negatively (less appropriately), M = 1.28, SD = 0.88, than participants in
the Affective Distraction condition, M = 0.82, SD = 0.67 (see Appendix C for figure of
negative affect ratings). Finally, results indicated a significant difference between the
Immediate and Neutral Distraction condition, t(56) = 2. 22, p = .03, such that participants
in the Neutral Distraction condition rated the best car more negatively, M = 1.28, SD =
0.88, than participants in the Immediate condition, M = 0.79, SD = 0.77.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 provide insight into the role of affect in complex decisionmaking. By manipulating whether participants attend to their affective evaluations or
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more cognitive evaluations in the Deliberation condition, the present study asks whether
deliberation of all kinds has similar effects on optimal decisions, or whether certain kinds
of deliberation are more or less helpful. The results suggest that reflecting on affective
evaluations during deliberation facilitates optimal choice providing some support for the
first tenet of the affective evaluation model: that using decision-relevant affect to make a
decision can help facilitate optimal decision-making.
These results also shed light on the utility of deliberation frames in shaping
subsequent decisions, and suggest that affective evaluations can be consciously attended
to such that optimal decision-making is increased. Unconscious thought theorists would
likely argue that drawing attention to these affective signals would disrupt unconscious
thought and thus decrease optimal choice (Dijksterhuis, 2004). If this is in fact the case,
then the results would show no difference between the quality of decisions in the
Affective Deliberation condition as compared to the Neutral Deliberation condition.
However, if it is decision-relevant affect that is necessary for optimal decision-making
and if affective evaluations are consciously accessible, than, as observed, the Affective
Deliberation condition should produce more optimal decisions than the Neutral condition.
Secondly, by introducing task irrelevant affective information in the Affective
Distraction condition, Study 1 continued to test the affective evaluation model’s proposal
that decision-relevant affective information is the key ingredient in optimal decisionmaking. This manipulation homed in on decision-relevance by comparing Affective
Distraction to Neutral Distraction and predicted that decision-irrelevant information
presented in the Affective Distraction condition would reduce the effectiveness of
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decision-relevant affective evaluations generated from the car attributes, thus reducing
the number of optimal decisions as compared to the Neutral Distraction condition. While
the negative attitude ratings indicated a pattern in the opposite of the predicted direction,
with participants in the Affective Distraction condition ratings the best car less negatively
(or more appropriately), than those in the Neutral Distraction condition, I did not observe
a difference between these two conditions in choice behavior.
Together these results suggest that instructing individuals to introspect about
decision-relevant affect may facilitate decision-making and that perhaps a stronger source
of interfering affect is needed to disrupt the influence of decision-relevant affect on
choice behavior.
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Chapter Four: Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated that instructing individuals to introspect about decisionrelevant affective evaluations could increase optimal choice compared to introspecting in
a way that did not emphasize affect as a source of information. Study 2 extended these
findings by asking if instructing individuals to utilize affective evaluations could improve
decision-making compared to instructing individuals to utilize only cognitive evaluations.
Study 2 achieved this goal by manipulating participants’ expectations of the helpfulness
of affective evaluations. By shifting participants’ expectations of affective evaluations, or
as lay people might call them “gut feelings”, Study 2 encouraged or discouraged
individuals to rely on affective evaluations during decision-making. If affective
evaluations are helpful, creating the expectation that they are helpful should increase the
amount of optimal choice. However, if affective evaluations are helpful, creating the
expectation that cognitive evaluations are helpful should decrease the amount of optimal
choice.
Participants
Participants included 261 MTurk workers (M = 32.58, SD = 8.84; 44% female).
MTurk workers were required to be 18 years of age or older, to have an approval rate of
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at least 95% (i.e., 95% or more of that participant’s previous submissions were approved
by requesters), completed at least 50 tasks, and were located in the United States. These
restrictions were to ensure comparability across my three studies, and followed guidelines
suggested by prior research using MTurk participants (Goodman, Cryder & Cheema,
2013). Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions, 52 in Neutral
Deliberation, 51 in Neutral Distraction, 53 in Cognition-Helpful, 53 in Affect-Helpful,
and 52 in the Immediate condition.
Procedure
Study 2 procedures closely followed Study 1 with a few exceptions. First, the task
was completed online so no physiology measures will be collected. Second, during the
delay period of each Deliberation condition participants were asked to continuously type
any thoughts that come to mind during the delay. This was to ensure that participants
remained on task even during the delay. Third, the delay was reduced to 3 minutes as
previous studies have shown that this duration is just as effective in producing the typical
complex decision making task effect as a longer delay (Strick et al., 2011). Finally, the
Affective Deliberation and Affective Distraction conditions were replaced with AffectHelpful and Cognition-Helpful, two conditions that manipulated participants’
expectations of the helpfulness of affective evaluations. As in Study 1, the key difference
occurred after all the information about each car has been presented. This was a betweensubjects design in which participants were assigned to one of the following five
conditions:
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Neutral Deliberation: In this condition participants were asked to “think very carefully
about what you think of each of the four cars” for three minutes before they were asked to
choose which car is best.
Neutral Distraction: In this condition participants were asked to solve anagrams of
affectively neutral words before they were asked to choose which car is best.
Immediate: In this condition participants were asked to make their decision immediately
after all of the option attributes were presented. This condition served as a comparison for
all other conditions.
Affect-Helpful: In this condition participants saw the following after attribute
presentation: “Research shows that using your gut, or intuition, is often helpful when
making a decision. Please try to use your gut or intuition to help you make your decision.
Please write any thoughts you have about each of the four cars into the box below.” The
instructions were designed to create the expectation that affective-evaluations are helpful
in decision-making and increase the reliance of participants on such evaluations,
therefore increasing the amount of optimal decisions as compared to the Neutral
Deliberation condition.
Cognition-Helpful: In this condition participants saw the following after attribute
presentation: “Research shows that using your head, or logic, is often helpful when
making a decision. Please use your head or logic to help you make your decision. Please
write any thoughts you have about each of the four cars into the box below.” The
instructions were designed to create the expectation that cognitive, deliberative
evaluations are helpful in decision-making and increase the reliance of participants on
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such evaluations, therefore decreasing the amount of optimal decisions as compared to
the Neutral Deliberation condition.
Data Analytic Strategy
The data analysis strategy for Study 2 was similar to Study 1 with the following
exceptions. First, to test the hypothesis that increasing the expectations that affective
evaluations are helpful, should increase the reliance on affective evaluations, and
therefore increase the amount of optimal choice, the Neutral Deliberation was compared
to the Affect-Helpful condition with the prediction that more participants in the AffectHelpful condition would choose the objectively best car as compared to those in the
Neutral Deliberation condition. This comparison was also made for attitude ratings such
that participants in the Affect-Helpful condition would more appropriately rate the
objectively best car than those in the Neutral Deliberation condition.
To test the second hypothesis that increasing the expectations that cognition alone
is helpful should decrease the reliance on affective evaluations, and therefore decrease
the amount of optimal choice, the Neutral Deliberation was compared to the CognitionHelpful condition with the prediction that more participants in the Neutral Deliberation
condition would choose the objectively best car compared to those in the CognitionHelpful condition. Once again this comparison was also made for attitude ratings such
that participants in the Neutral Deliberation condition would more appropriately rate the
objectively best car than those in the Cognition-Helpful condition.
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Results
Choice behavior. As in Study 1, the number of participants that selected the
objectively best car in each condition was submitted to a chi-squared test of
independence. Unlike Study 1, the overall chi-square with all five conditions (i.e.,
Neutral Deliberation, Neutral Distraction, Immediate, Affect-Helpful, and CognitionHelpful) did not show that condition had an impact on whether or not the best car was
selected, χ2(4) = 6.30, p = .18 (see Appendix D for a figure depicting the percent of
participants that chose the objectively best car in each condition). The original effect
(Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) was not replicated with no difference between the number of
participants in the Neutral Distraction condition selecting the objectively best choice
compared to those in the Neutral Deliberation condition (p = .78). Unlike in Study 1, no
support was found for the first hypothesis that increasing the expectations that affective
evaluations are helpful would increase the amount of optimal choice, as there was no
significant association between the Neutral Deliberation compared to the Affect-Helpful
condition and whether or not participants selected the best car (p > .18). Contrary to the
predictions of the second hypothesis, the results indicated that of the participants who
selected the objectively best car, a somewhat higher percentage were in the CognitionHelpful condition than in the Neutral Deliberation condition, χ2(1) = 3.20, p = .07. The
2x2 chi-squared test of independence indicated no significant association between the
Immediate condition and any other condition, and whether or not participants selected the
best car (all ps > .19).
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Attitude ratings. As in Study 1, to most informatively supplement the choice
data analyses, which focused on the objectively best car, attitude analyses also focused on
the attitudes towards the best car. Neither the results of the one-way ANOVA for positive
(see Appendix E), nor negative ratings (see Appendix F) showed a main effect of
condition (all ps > .42). Follow-up, independent samples t-tests indicated no differences
between Neutral Deliberation compared to, Neutral Distraction, Cognition-Helpful, or
Affect-Helpful, for positive or negative ratings (all ps > .13). Comparisons of each
condition with the Immediate condition did not indicate any differences for positive or
negative ratings (all ps > .36).
Discussion
Study 2 examined the effect of expectations of the helpfulness of affective
evaluations on decision-making. The results did not support the hypothesis that
increasing expectations that affective evaluations are helpful in decision-making leads to
more optimal decision making as compared to no manipulation of expectations. The
results of Study 2 somewhat contradict Study 1 in which I did see evidence that
instructing participants to introspect about decision-relevant affect information improved
the quality of their decision-making. There are several reasons why Study 2 may differ
from Study 1. First, by instructing participants to write down their thoughts during the
delay period I may have encouraged individuals to make a more immediate choice, or
ruminate on a single option, rather than considering all choices. In fact, coding and
analysis of the written response data indicated that 41.14% of participants mentioned
only one or fewer cars in their free responses. This shift may have made the Neutral
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Deliberation, Cognition-Helpful and Affect-Helpful conditions more similar to the
Immediate condition during which participants made the choice immediately after the car
attributes were presented. Having participants write down their thoughts may have also
increased confabulation (or the tendency to make up or distort memories without the
intent to deceive) of the reasons behind their decision-making. Prior research has
demonstrated that even when individuals are trying to express the reasons behind their
decisions (Harte, Westenberg, & van Someren, 1994) they are often not privy to the real
reasons behind their choices (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Given that such confabulation
might favor cognitive reasons over affective ones (i.e., if one is trying to think of why
they chose something they might be more likely to list a fact rather than a feeling),
having participants in the Affect-Helpful condition write down their reasons may have
reduced the influence of the belief manipulation. In fact, only 15.38% participants in the
Neutral Deliberation, 7.55% in the Cognition-Helpful and 18.87% in the Affect-Helpful
condition used ‘feeling’ words in their written responses. Despite the changes instructing
participants to record their thoughts during the delay might have had on the Deliberation
conditions, I felt it necessary to ensure participants remained on task while participating
in an online study with such a long delay period. Furthermore, the information collected
in the responses shed some light on how participants reasoned through their decisions, an
insight that would not be accessible had participants not recorded their thoughts during
the delay.
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Chapter Five: Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 aimed to provide important information about the malleability of
decision-making behavior, and usefulness of attending to affective evaluations during
decision-making, but only did so in the context of a fairly specialized, complex decisionmaking task. While this task did provide important insight into some of the complex
decisions we make throughout our lives, it did not incorporate one heavily explored facet
of decision-making: risk. Previous models that consider affect’s role in decision-making
have often examined risky decisions and have concluded that during such decisions,
affective responses typically lead individuals to make sub-optimal choices (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Through the
lens of the affective evaluation model, these results are explained in terms of the
decision-relevance of affective responses. If such responses are generated towards the
risk and not the overall value of the object, then the affective evaluation model would not
consider affective responses to risk decision-relevant affective evaluations, and therefore
detrimental to the decision-making process. Study 3 examined if increasing the
expectation that affect is helpful during decision-making could selectively increase the
use of decision-relevant affective evaluations—and not simply all affective responding
36

towards risk—using a modified version of a decision-making under risk paradigm called
the Slot Machine Game (Martin et al., 2014).
Participants
Participants included 159 MTurk workers (M = 34.18, SD = 9.72; 43% female).
MTurk workers were required to be 18 years of age or older, to have an approval rate of
at least 95% (i.e., 95% or more of that participant’s previous submissions were approved
by requesters), completed at least 50 tasks, and were located in the United States. These
restrictions were to ensure comparability across my three studies, and followed guidelines
suggested by prior research using MTurk participants (Goodman, Cryder & Cheema,
2013). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions with 53 in
Cognition-Helpful, 53 in Affect-Helpful, and 53 in the Look condition.
Procedure
Consent, questionnaire, and debriefing procedures were the same as Study 2 and
took place entirely online. The Slot Machine Game (SMG) closely mirrored that
performed in Martin et al. (2014). Before beginning the game participants were given
affect-expectation instructions. Participants were divided into three groups and were
given one of the following sets of instructions:
Affect-Helpful: Recent research has shown that when you’re making any sort of decision
using your gut feelings or intuitions concerning the choices is very helpful. The task you
will complete today is designed so that gut feelings or intuition will help you make your
decision. Please rely on your feelings about the decision at hand as much as possible.
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Before each trial you will see the words “consider your feelings”, to remind you to rely
on your feelings. (Emphasis appeared to participants).
Cognition-Helpful: Recent research has shown that when you’re making any sort of
decision using your head or logic concerning the choices is very helpful. The task you
will complete today is designed so that your head or logic will help you make your
decision. Please rely on the facts about the decision at hand as much as possible. Before
each trial you will see the words “consider your facts”, to remind you to rely on the facts.
(Emphasis appeared to participants).
Look: In this condition participants were told about the task instructions but no affectexpectation instructions were presented.
After the expectation instructions participants were told how to complete the task.
Before each block of trials participants were reminded of the condition phrase (i.e., either
“consider your feelings”, “consider the facts” or “look” depending on condition). Each
trial of the SMG consisted of the decision screen (two monetary values with differing
risks; 4s) and an inter-trial interval (4 or 6 s). Inter-trial intervals were varied to increase
focus on the decision-screen, as participants did not know exactly when the decision
screen would appear.
Decisions were between two monetary options: one risky (e.g., 50% chance of
winning $8.41) one safe (e.g., 100% chance of winning $4.20). Importantly, the risky and
safe option varied with respect to which option has the higher expected value. Expected
value (Rabin, 2000) is defined as the amount of reward (i.e., the monetary amount)
multiplied by the amount of risk (i.e., 50% or 100%). For example, if a decision for a
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given trial is “50% chance of winning $8.41 OR $100 chance of winning $4.20” then the
expected value of option 1 is $8.41 multiplied by .5 which equals $4.20. The expected
value of option 2 is $4.20 multiplied by 1, which equals $4.20. Risky options varied in
extent of risk (i.e., 35%, 50% or 65%) but were always compared to a certain option (i.e.,
100%). Three distinct trial types were generated using the discrepancy between expected
value and risk:
Risky-Advantageous: A trial in which the expected value was greater for the risky option.
Equal: A trial in which the expected value was equal for both the risky and safe option.
Risky-Disadvantageous: A trial in which the expected value was greater for the safe
option.
These trial types (12 of each type) allowed the assessment of decision-relevance,
as affective responses to the expected value of choice options were defined as decisionrelevant affect because they provided valuable information about the monetary value of
choice options, while affective responses to the overall risk of choice options were
defined as decision-irrelevant affect because they did not consistently indicate which
choice option had the greater monetary value. Trial type and the extent of risk were
counterbalanced across trails. To ensure that participants were aware that each trial was
independent and important, they were also told at the beginning of the study that they
would receive the amount of money they won on a randomly selected trial. MTurk
workers were granted a bonus based on their task performance in addition to their
standard compensation rate.
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Data analytic strategy
The SMG task consisted of a 3x3 mixed design: Expectation (between subjects;
Affect-Helpful, Cognition-Helpful, Look) and Decision Type (within subjects; RiskyAdvantageous, Equal, Risky-Disadvantageous). For each unique condition, participants’
choices were quantified as the average number of times that the risky option is selected.
A risky decision was defined as any time a participant selected the uncertain (i.e., not
100%) option. A mixed-model ANOVA was used to test two competing hypotheses: 1)
Participants in the Affect-Helpful condition would avoid the risker option more often
than those in the Cognition Helpful condition, regardless of Decision Type or that 2)
Participants in the Affect-Helpful condition would avoid the riskier option during RiskyDisadvantageous trials, but select the riskier option during Risky-Advantageous trials.
First a mixed-model ANOVA of Expectation (Affect-Helpful, Cognition-Helpful,
Look) and Decision Type (Risky-Advantageous, Risky-Disadvantageous, Equal) was
conducted for the number of risky decisions in each condition. A main effect of the
Decision Type was predicted, such that all participants would make a greater number of
risky decisions Risky-Advantageous trials as compared to the Equal or the RiskyDisadvantageous trials. No main effect of condition in overall risk taking was predicted
(i.e., no support for hypothesis 1). In agreement with hypothesis 2, an interaction of
Expectation and Decision Type was predicted, such that participants in the AffectHelpful condition would make a greater number of risky decisions in the RiskyAdvantageous condition compared to the Risky-Disadvantageous condition than
participants in the Cognition-Helpful or Look conditions. Participants in the Look and the
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Cognition-Helpful conditions were predicted to make comparable risky decisions during
the Risky-Advantageous decision-type as compared to the Equal or RiskyDisadvantageous decision-type. Planned comparisons (independent samples t-tests) of
each decision type were conducted to further probe each of the above hypotheses.
Results
The results of the 3x3 mixed-model ANOVA described above indicated a main
effect of Decision-Type, F(2, 312) = 149.85, p < .001, η2= .49 (see Appendix G for a
graph of the proportion of participants who selected the risky option in each condition),
such that participants selected the risky option a greater proportion of the time during the
Risky-Advantageous trials (M = .45, SD = .03), compared to Neutral (M = .16, SD = .02),
or Risky-Disadvantageous trials (M = .08, SD = .01). These results replicated the
manipulation effect found in Martin et al. (2014) and served as a manipulation check for
the current, online version of the task. The results did not provide any support for the
hypothesis that increasing belief that affect is useful during decision-making would
selectively increase attention to decision-relevant affective evaluations, with no main
effect of Expectation, F(2, 156) = 1.99, p = .14, η2= .03, nor an Expectation by DecisionType interaction, F(4, 312) = 1.61, p = .17, η2= .02. Planned comparisons using Tukey’s
HSD correction, did not reveal any differences between Expectation levels (i.e., AffectHelpful, Cognition-Helpful, or Look) for any Decision-Type (i.e., Risky-Advantageous,
Neutral, or Risky-Disadvantageous), all ps > .12.
Although no differences emerged in average risk taking between Expectation
levels, exploratory chi-square analyses indicated differences between conditions for the
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number of participants who invariably selected certain (100%) options. In other words,
these participants exhibited especially risk-averse behavior, as they never selected the
riskier option even when it was advantageous to do so (e.g., in the Risky-Advantageous
condition). First, the overall chi-square test for independence comparing the number of
participants who always selected the certain option (i.e., were especially risk-averse)
across Affect-Helpful, Cognition-Helpful, and Look, was significant, χ2(2) = 9.20, p =
.01(see Appendix H). A pair-wise comparison of conditions indicated a trend when
comparing the number of participants who always selected the certain option (100%
probability of winning) in the Cognition-Helpful compared to the Affect-Helpful
condition, χ2(1) = 3.69, p = .06, and a significant difference between the CognitionHelpful and Look condition, χ2(1) = 8.40, p < .01, such that more participants always
selected the certain option in the Cognition-Helpful condition. There was no difference
between the number of participants who always selected the certain option in the AffectHelpful compared to the Look condition, χ2(1) = 1.07, p = .30.
Discussion
Study 3 aimed to extend the examination of the affective evaluation model by
asking if increasing the belief that affect is helpful during decision-making can
selectively increase the influence of decision-relevant affective signals. This design
aimed to help answer this question by independently manipulating the influence of
decision-relevant (the affective evaluation associated with the expected value of an
option) and decision-irrelevant affective information (the affective response associated
with the amount of risk alone), and instructing some participants that affect is helpful
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during decision making and others that cognition is helpful. The results did not
demonstrate that the Affective-Helpful manipulation caused participants to make a
greater number of risky decisions during the Risky-Advantageous as compared to the
Risky-Disadvantageous decision types. Nor did the results provide support for the
alternative hypothesis that instructing individuals to utilize affective evaluations would
increase risk-taking in general (i.e., risk taking was not greater for participants in the
affect-helpful condition compared to cognition-helpful or look, regardless of DecisionType). However, exploratory analyses suggest that participants in the Cognition-Helpful
condition were more likely to always select the certain option, regardless of DecisionType, as compared to those in the Affect-Helpful or Look conditions. This type of
blanket risk aversion, that is insensitive to context and the specific attributes of each
decision option (e.g. that the risky option in the Risky-Advantageous condition had a
greater expected value than the certain option), may lead to less nuanced and flexible
decision-making that could result in poorer outcomes over time.
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Chapter Six: General Discussion
Decision-making plays a role in many facets of life and has implications for fields
as varied as consumer-research to international relations (Adaval, 2013; Levy, 1992).
While it is clear that affect influences decision-making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Clore
& Huntsinger, 2007; Khaneman & Tversky, 1979; Loewenstein et al., 2001), how this
influence occurs and when it is helpful has been hard to determine. The affective
evaluation model attempts to describe one way in which affect might influence decisionmaking and uses this model to determine conditions under which affect is helpful and
harmful to the decision-making process. The central tenet of the model is that decisionrelevant affective evaluations are helpful to decision-making but decision-irrelevant
affective signals are harmful. The proposed studies aimed to test this central premise with
conditions that were designed to emphasize or deemphasize the use of task-related
affective evaluations thus examining if decision-relevance is a key ingredient in allowing
affect to facilitate optimal choice. Study 1 demonstrated that instructing individuals to
rely on affect during complex decision-making can lead to more optimal decisionmaking. Study 2 aimed to extend Study 1 by manipulating expectations of the helpfulness
of affective evaluations, but did not support this hypothesis. Finally, Study 3 applied the
expectation manipulation of Study 2 to an economic decision-making task, demonstrating

that participants who were told that cognition is useful tended to be more risk averse than
those who were told that affect is useful. Together these studies provide some support for
the affective evaluation model, as emphasizing affective evaluations (vs. cognitive
evaluations) often resulted in more optimal decision-making.
Study 1 manipulated whether participants attended to their affective or cognitive
evaluations during a complex decision-making task, and asked whether deliberation of all
kinds had a similar effect on decision-making. This is similar to the framing effects
literature that demonstrates that how a decision is presented significantly changes the
subsequent choices (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
However, rather than manipulating how options are presented, Study 1 asked if the
decision-maker’s own frame or strategy, manipulated after all relevant information was
presented, can significantly influence their choices. Results indicated that asking
participants to deliberate using their affective evaluations leads to more optimal decisionmaking. These results are especially surprising given that the only difference between the
Neutral and Affective Deliberation conditions was a single word in the instructions:
“think” vs. “feel”. What is even more compelling is that this subtle manipulation was
between subjects, so participants were not able to compare the Neutral and Affective
Deliberation instructions to assist them in understanding the contrast between the two.
Simply by using the word “feel” in the instructions, participants in the AffectDeliberation condition were able to make more optimal decisions.
While these results provide some support for one tenet of the affective evaluation
model, what is still uncertain is whether individuals can selectively utilize decision45

relevant, affective evaluations. All affective evaluations in the Deliberation conditions of
Study 1 were ostensibly decision-relevant, therefore providing no opportunity to
determine if individuals could parse apart decision-relevant and irrelevant affective
evaluations. This limitation was considered and accepted as a necessary stepping-stone to
understand how affective evaluations function during complex decision-making. Study 1
did provide evidence that a very subtle decision-frame that encouraged the use of affect
during decision-making, could lead to more optimal choices. This result changes the most
common interpretation of previous studies: that conscious thought (as in the deliberation
condition) necessarily leads to fewer optimal choices because of the attentional
limitations and biasing heuristics that characterize such thinking (Dijksterhuis et al.,
2006). The affective evaluation model would reconcile these two findings as examples of
instances in which decision-relevant affect was emphasized as a tool during deliberation
(Study 1) and instances in which no such tool was provided. Deliberation with no
affective emphasis may result in conscious deliberation that falls victim to the limited
attentional resources, heuristics, and biases that have been shown to plague conscious,
effortful, deliberation and that can often lead an individual away from an optimal choice
(Study 1 Neutral Deliberation condition; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Tversky & Khaneman,
1974). In fact, research examining the difference between intuitive and deliberative
judgments in perceptual decision-making mirrors this finding by demonstrating that it is
the content of deliberative thoughts that positively predict decision-making quality (Leisti
& Hakkinen, 2016).
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While Study 1 demonstrated that deliberating on affective evaluations during
complex decision-making could lead to more optimal choices, Study 2 failed to support
this hypothesis. It may be the case that manipulating beliefs about the usefulness of affect
does not have the same impact as a more subtle manipulation instructing participants to
reflect on thoughts or feelings during the decision-making process. While it is has been
demonstrated that more subtle goal-priming manipulations often have an effect
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), the belief manipulation in Study 2 was intended less as a
prime and more as an explicit tool to aid participants in their decision-making. Previous
studies that instruct individuals to utilize certain strategies to influence their thought
processes have been shown to be effective (Martin et al., 2014; Sokol-Hessner et al.,
2009), but the effectiveness of such strategies do interact with a participants’ ability to
implement them (Buhle et al., 2014). Therefore it is possible that the beliefs manipulation
of Study 2 was less effective than the general strategy of Study 2 because participants
were less able to explicitly implement the affect-focused or cognition-focused tool.
Future research could test this hypothesis by pitting the Study 2 instructions against a
more, and less subtle instruction. By determining how much instruction is needed to
positively impact the use of decision-relevant affective signals during decision-making,
future research could inform interventions to aid in everyday choices.
Study 2 was conducted completely online and, as discussed in the discussion
section for Study 2, this may have fundamentally changed the design of this task. Having
participants write down their thoughts during the delay period after reading about their
options, may have led to confabulation of fact-based reasons behind their decision47

making (Leisti & Hakkinen, 2016; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) leading participants away
from the use of affective evaluations. Analysis of the free response data collected from
each participant during the delay supports this hypothesis (see Study 2 discussion). In
accordance with this idea, the overall act of trying to explain one’s reasoning might be
more useful when the decision options have fewer attributes or attributes that are easily
quantifiable and comparable (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Leisti &
Hakkinen, 2016). When choices have fewer attributes for example, it might be easier to
keep in mind the attributes you most value, and to efficiently compare each attribute to
the others without succumbing to such biases as the availability heuristic (Tversky &
Khaneman, 1973). When choice attributes are easily quantifiable and comparable, like in
many risky economic decision-making tasks in which two monetary values are presented
to a decision-maker (see Kuhberger, 1998 for review), writing out one’s thought process
might be beneficial as it is clear that the factor that makes one option better than the other
is the monetary value. In complex decision-making tasks in which each option has
multiple attributes and these attributes are not easily comparable (e.g., a dollar amount to
a dollar amount is more comparable than a location to square footage), writing out one’s
thought process might not be as helpful because one is often not privy to the real reason
for preferring one attribute over another (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; e.g., you may think
you care more about square footage but you really care a lot more about location). Future
studies may test to see if instructing individuals to write down their thoughts during
decision-making leads to more optimal decision-making when each choice has fewer
attributes as compared to many attributes. Another important comparison would be
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between more comparable and quantifiable attributes versus decision-problems with less
comparable and quantifiable attributes. Perhaps writing during decision-making is only
beneficial when the value of each attribute is easily quantifiable, and that quantity is
comparable across attributes (e.g., monetary value).
To further probe the question of decision-relevance, Study 3 examined if framing
affect as useful during decision-making could increase reliance on decision-relevant
affective evaluations but not decision-irrelevant affective evaluations. Previous research
has demonstrated that risk perception can powerfully influence decision-making,
revealing that affect is central to decision-making but not always helpful (Levin,
Schneider & Gaeth, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In such risky decision-making
paradigms, affective responses to risk often lead participants away from the option that
would make them the most amount of money. Making the risk an unhelpful source of
information if the participant’s goal is to find the option that leads to the most monetary
gain. Tools such as “think like a trader” dampened affective responding throughout the
entire task reducing the adverse effects of risk aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009).
However such manipulations might have reduced the benefits of decision-relevant
affective evaluations along with the costs of decision-irrelevant affective responses.
Study 3 tested if it is possible to selectively promote responding to decision-relevant
affective evaluations without amplifying responses to decision-irrelevant affective
responses (e.g., responses to risk). Primary analyses from Study 3 did not provide support
for this hypothesis. Participants in the Affect-Helpful condition did not differentiate
between Risky-Advantageous and Risky-Disadvantageous trial types to a greater extent
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than those in the Look, or Cognition-Helpful conditions. Instead, across all conditions,
participants selected the risky options a greater percentage of the time during the RiskyAdvantageous trials as compared to the Risky-Disadvantageous trials. This blanket
preference for the Risky-Advantageous trials could be due to the salience of the expected
value of each option. Although expected values in each trial type were intended to be
subtly different, this difference may have become obvious to participants, making the
choice between risky and certain options easy in either Risky-Advantageous or RiskyDisadvantageous trial types. It may also be the case that because this study took place
online participants may have used a calculator or written down the calculations to
compute the expected values of each option—something that was prevented in previous
studies that employed this paradigm (Martin et al., 2014). This type of easy calculation
that could occur in the slot machine game paradigm, speaks the point made earlier: that
relying on affective evaluations during decision-making may be less beneficial when
choice attributes are easily comparable, as they are in monetary decision-making tasks.
Future research may try to examine if decision-relevant affect can be selectively
attended to, by designing a complex decision-making task with attributes that evoke
specific affective responses in the decision-maker. Then, while deciding between the
options, researchers could introduce a task-irrelevant affective signal (e.g., sad music). If
participants who are trained to introspect about decision-relevant affect during decisionmaking are able to make decisions that are congruent with the task-relevant affective
signal, then there is some evidence that this type of training can help facilitate decisionmaking.
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Despite the lack of an overall condition interaction with trial type, exploratory
analyses indicated that a greater number of participants in the Cognition-Helpful
condition always selected the certain option as compared to those in the Look or AffectHelpful conditions, regardless of the risky option’s expected value. These results suggest
that participants in the Cognition-Helpful condition were more likely to completely avoid
any risk, whether financially advantageous or not. The Cognition-Helpful instruction
echoed conventional wisdom that individuals should make decisions devoid of emotion,
that this would lead to the most ‘logical’ choices. However, as many psychologists have
demonstrated, affect is an undeniable (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1983),
and even critical (Damasio, 1994) component of decision-making. These preliminary
results suggest that such denouncements of emotion in decision-making may be putting
decision-makers at a great disadvantage. Instead of such a denouncement, with no
consideration of nuance, future research might explore conditions under which relying on
affective responses to decision-options does in fact facilitate choice, and when a decisionmaker might be better off employing such a blanket emotion-avoidant strategy.
Limitations and Future directions
Studies 1 and 3 provided preliminary evidence that instructing individuals to rely
on affective evaluations may facilitate optimal decision-making under certain
circumstances. However, the generalizability of these studies is limited due to the nature
of the tasks, and the affective belief manipulation. First, it is unclear if such belief
manipulation would positively influence decision-making outside of a laboratory setting,
in which many other task-irrelevant affective evaluations could be generated. The
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complex decision-making task was carefully chosen in order to examine a context in
which cognitive evaluations were demonstrated to be detrimental to decision-making
(Dijksterhuis, 2004) to see if the introduction of an emphasis on affect into the
deliberation condition would offset the demonstrated cost that the pure cognitive
evaluations seemed to have in this decision-making context. This was especially
important because the types of decisions made in the complex decision-making tasks are
analogous to ones that every individual encounters and the consequences of these choices
are great. However, unlike real-world decisions, this lab-based task did not include the
meta-emotions that often accompany a complex life choice (e.g., anxiety about buying a
new car, above and beyond affective evaluations about the car’s features). Future studies
could attempt to add this layer of decision-irrelevant affect to see if participants are able
to distinguish between affective evaluations of the decision options, and their affective
response to having to make a choice at all.
The slot machine game was chosen as a decision-under-risk task as it is poised to
contribute to a vast literature concerning risky decisions and also exemplifies a type of
decision commonly made in every day life (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Sokol-Hessner et
al., 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Because one trial type rewarded the reliance on
decision-relevant affect (i.e., Risky-Advantageous trials) and another trial type rewarded
the reliance on decision-irrelevant affect (i.e., Risky-Disadvantageous trials), the slot
machine game provided an opportunity to see if an instruction to emphasize affect during
decision-making could selectively impact trials in which relying on affect would lead to
greater financial gain. Despite this design, no interaction emerged between trial types and
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belief manipulation. This may be due to the strength of the belief manipulation, which
was intentionally subtle, or the nature of economic decision-making tasks. As stated
above, in such tasks both options are relatively easy to compare: a dollar amount vs. a
dollar amount. Unlike economic tasks, decisions such as where to move, or who to trust,
often have less comparable attributes such as family proximity vs. good job prospects.
Such attributes may be less obviously quantifiable and may therefore benefit more from
reliance on affective evaluations that result from each option. These affective evaluations
may serve as a common currency with which one can more easily compare the value of
family proximity to the value of job prospects. Future research may explore this idea by
asking participants to assign an explicit value to seemingly incomparable choice
attributes, to add those values up, and finally to select the option with the largest sum.
Participants could also be encouraged to rely on affect when assigning an explicit value
or not. If those that rely on affect chose the more optimal option, there would be some
support for the common currency hypothesis.
Implications
The present research has three main implications. First, there is some evidence
that decision-relevance is an important determining factor in whether affect will facilitate
or hinder optimal decision-making. Future studies examining decision-making processes
should consider whether their design is biased towards decision-relevant or irrelevant
affective evaluations and adjust their interpretations of results accordingly. For example,
in classic risky, economic, decision-making paradigms (Kuhberger, 1998), researchers
might consider comparing instances where risk aversion leads to the more optimal choice
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with times in which it does not. As risk aversion has been hypothesized to be
evolutionarily adaptive (Hintze, Olson, Adami, & Hertwig, 2015), it may be helpful to
determine the circumstances under which our natural propensity towards certainty can
lead to better decision-making.
Second, the present research provides preliminary evidence that instructing
individuals to rely on affect during decision making can, under certain circumstances,
leads to more optimal choices. While more research is needed to determine the size and
consistency of the observed effects, it may be the case that a subtle instruction to rely on
affect can improve decision-making outcomes, just as subtle instructions to take a long
term perspective on investments can improve financial outcomes (Martin et al., 2014;
Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). Such instruction could even be conveyed in writing (as in the
present research), needing no additional training, just the reminder to consider affective
responses while making a decision. These reminders might be especially useful when
individuals are attempting to make a rather complicated financial, health, or life decision
(Lauver et al., 2002).
Finally, the present research suggests that how information is presented and
consumed during the decision-making process can have important consequences for the
role of affect in said process, and the quality of choice. Prior research has established that
how a decision is framed can exacerbate the negative effects of affect on choice behavior
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The present research adds to this framework by
suggesting that there may be ways to present and consume information that could
capitalize on helpful, decision-relevant affective responding during decision-making. For
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example, when making a complex decision the success of which will be measured by an
individual’s satisfaction with the choice (i.e., when making a big purchase, or move;
Dijksterhuis, 2004), it may be beneficial to gather all of the relevant information,
deliberate on the attributes of one option, then take some time to reflect on the feelings
generated during that deliberation, before comparing it to the feelings generated by the
other choice’s attributes. This deliberate integration of affective signals during complex
decision-making may provide a method through which individuals can avoid the pitfalls
of affect during decision-making (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007), while capitalizing on the
benefits (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Loewenstein et al., 2001).
Conclusion
The present research aimed to understand the role of affect in decision-making
and attempted to determine conditions under which affect may be consistently helpful.
By comparing an affectively-focused deliberation strategy to a purely cognitive strategy,
the present research demonstrated a cognitive-evaluation-only decision-making strategy
can lead to less optimal decision-making than one that incorporates affective-evaluations.
These results could help individuals’ decision-making strategies. Instead of ignoring your
‘heart’ and going with your ‘head’—as colloquial wisdom often recommends—
incorporating your heart’s desires during decision-making might actually lead to a choice
the decision-maker would ultimately be happier with. In addition to influencing the
decision-maker, this research may influence how decisions are presented. For example,
health care decisions may be framed in a way that facilitates the use of decision-relevant
affective evaluations thus allowing patients with cognitive deficits to make their own
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decisions and remain autonomous for a longer portion of their lives. Decision-making is
a constant and essential process and understanding how to make more optimal choices
will improve a myriad of outcomes on both small and large scales.
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Appendix A
Figure 1. Percent of participants who selected the best car in each condition. Comparison
bars indicate that a significantly greater number of participants selected the best car in the
Neutral Distraction condition compared to the Neutral Deliberation condition, the
Affective Deliberation compared to Neutral Deliberation, and the Neutral Distraction and
Affective Deliberation compared to the Immediate Condition (all ps < .05).
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Appendix B
Figure 2. Positive attitude ratings towards the best car in each condition.
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Appendix C
Figure 3. Negative attitude ratings towards the best car in each condition. The
comparison bars indicate that participants in the Affective Distraction and Immediate
conditions rated the best car more negatively (more appropriately), than participants in
the Neutral Distraction condition (p < .05).
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Appendix D
Figure 4. Percent of participants who selected the best car in each condition. Comparison
bars denote a trend level difference (p =.07), indicating that a greater number of
participants selected the best car in the Cognition Helpful condition compared to the
Neutral Deliberation condition.
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Appendix E
Figure 5. Positive attitude ratings towards the best car in each condition.
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Appendix F
Figure 6. Negative attitude ratings towards the best car in each condition.
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Appendix G
Figure 7. Proportion of trials in which the risky trials were selected. Comparison bars
indicate a main effect of Decision Type.
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Appendix H
Figure 8. Number of participants who always selected the certain option regardless of
Decision Type (Risk-Averse) compared to participants who sometimes selected a risky
option. Comparison bars indicate that a greater number of participants in the CognitionHelpful condition always selected the certain option as compared to participants in the
Affect-Helpful (p = .06) and Look conditions (p < .01).
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